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Abstract
Citizens use the initiative process to make new laws. Many winning initiatives, however, are
altered or ignored after Election Day. We examine why this is, paying particular attention to
several widely-ignored properties of the post-election phase of the initiative process. One such
property is the fact that initiative implementation can require numerous governmental actors to
comply with an initiative’s policy instructions. Knowing such properties, the question then
becomes: When do governmental actors comply with winning initiatives? We clarify when
compliance is full, partial, or not at all. Our findings provide a template for scholars and
observers to better distinguish cases where governmental actors' policy preferences replace
initiative content as a determinant of a winning initiative's policy impact from cases where an
initiative’s content affects policy despite powerful opponents’ objections. Our work implies that
the consequences of this form of democracy are more predictable, but less direct, than often
presumed.
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Introduction
The initiative process is a form of direct democracy that allows citizens to make new
laws.1 In the US, organized support for the initiative process arose from groups who were
disgruntled with their state or local governments’ refusal to act on certain issues (Deverell and
Sitton 1994). Over the past century, 24 states and hundreds of localities have adopted the
initiative process. While sometimes controversial, the use of voter initiatives has grown steadily
over the last century and is now the arena for some of the nation’s most important political
debates.
Many people think of the initiative process as one that allows citizens to make laws
without government interference. Yet the post-electoral history of initiatives paints a different
picture. Many initiatives that win at the ballot box, for example, are challenged in the courts.
Court rulings that strike down initiatives tend to be very public and are widely perceived as the
primary obstacle preventing winning initiatives from having their intended policy impact.
We contend that less recognized, but just as critical to the fate of winning initiatives, are
the actions taken after the election by unelected bureaucrats and elected officials. Indeed, there is
great variation in what happens to initiatives after voters approve them. Some initiatives take full
effect, while many others are altered substantially or just ignored.
Such variation in treatment occurs because every winning initiative gives governmental
actors an opportunity to make implementation and enforcement decisions. When making these
decisions, governmental actors can reinterpret, or even reverse, an initiative’s policy mandate. Put
differently, if an initiative is to affect policy, then governmental actors must take an active role in
converting its policy instructions into actual practice.

1

We use the term initiative process to refer to its most common form, the direct initiative. A less common
form of the process, the indirect initiative, allows a legislature to pass a citizen proposal after it qualifies for
the ballot but before the election. Here, we focus on direct initiatives.
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If, for example, complying with an initiative entails raising new funds, spending new
funds, or reallocating existing funds – as many initiatives do – then the legislature, and not the
initiative’s authors, must make these funds available (i.e., the legislature must revise previous
budget agreements to incorporate a winning initiative’s budgetary requirements; see, e.g., Alt and
Lowry 1994). If the legislature chooses not authorize the necessary funds, then no resources are
available for implementation and enforcement and the initiative’s ultimate policy impact is
negligible. Other initiatives provide only vague implementing instructions. If state or local
bureaucrats need more precise instructions about how to implement a winning initiative, then
some governmental actor must write these instructions and the legislature or a high-level
bureaucrat must approve them. When the actors responsible for writing or approving the
instructions have discretion over their content, then the actors charged with carrying out those
instructions may be ordered to act in ways that are quite different than the initiative’s sponsors
intended. In the limit, if the governmental actors responsible for writing or approving
implementation choose not to act at all, then the initiative’s Election Day victory is effectively
reversed.
To clarify the policy impact of voter initiatives, we examine governmental actors’
decisions and incentives after Election Day. We use the term “compliance” to refer generically to
actors’ decisions to implement and/or enforce initiatives as they were written. We consider
compliance to be full when governmental actors implement and enforce an initiative as it was
written. We consider compliance to be partial when some part of the initiative is reinterpreted or
ignored by governmental actors. We consider there to be no compliance when governmental
actors ignore the initiative entirely. Note that when an actor chooses partial compliance, the
reinterpretation need not be detrimental to the initiative proponents' interests. The point is simply
that the decisions of governmental actors replace the content of a winning initiative as a
determinant of how voter initiatives affect public policy.
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The core of our study is an applied formal model that focuses on governmental actors’
post-election decision making. Our model builds upon, refines, and extends the empirical work of
scholars such as Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) and Gerber et al (2000) who examine the many
challenges associated with implementing political mandates. We find that full compliance is
possible for certain kinds of initiatives and difficult or impossible for all others. Indeed, we prove
that under normal conditions, governmental actors' policy preferences displace initiative content
as a determinant of a winning initiative's policy impact.
This finding is important for several reasons. First, it reveals the importance of treating
legislative and bureaucratic reactions to the initiative process with the same seriousness that is
accorded court reactions. To the common wisdom that resistance to legal challenge is a necessary
condition for a winning initiative to have a shot at changing policy, we add that legislative and
bureaucratic interests being aligned in special ways is just as necessary. As such, our findings
draw attention to the idea that court action is but one way in which political actors may change
the result after the election is over. Put another way, focusing only on the courts when attempting
to assess an initiative’s likely post-election impact is a recipe for substantial error.
Second, our work implies that the policy consequences of this form of democracy are far
less direct than often presumed. This implication matters because a growing number of groups
and individuals across the country spend increasing amounts of time, money, and other resources
to change laws via the initiative process. Many voters, contributors, journalists, and analysts who
do not follow initiative politics closely act on the belief that victory at the polls – plus a
successful defense of legal challenges – equals a swift and dramatic policy change. Our work
turns this very common wisdom on its head. While we identify conditions under which this belief
is true, we find that it is normally false. Understanding these aspects of the initiative process can
help future participants and scholars direct their efforts more effectively. Indeed, our work shows
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that much of what is important to understanding the initiative process’ policy consequences
occurs after Election Day.
We continue as follows. Next, we provide substantive background on the initiative
process. Then, we describe the model and present our results. A conclusion section ends the paper
and an appendix includes relevant technical details.

Two Things To Know About Initiatives
In this section, we provide two pieces of background information on the initiative
process. The first piece of information motivates us to conduct this research. The second piece of
information shapes the manner in which we proceed.
The first piece of information is that many people believe that victory at the polls implies
direct and substantial policy change. Our null hypothesis is that such beliefs are true and our main
result is that they are normally false. The second piece of information is that the kinds of people
or groups who place initiatives on the ballot are likely to have enemies in government. Our
research agenda is designed to clarify how this fact affects the initiative process’ policy
consequences.
1. Voters believe that winning initiatives bring big changes
Many states and localities allow lawmaking by initiative. The high profile of some
initiative battles gives the impression that initiatives have a large and direct policy impact. The
style of modern initiative campaigns reinforces this perception. Today’s campaigns often come
down to a battle of sound bites, endorsements, and direct mail -- all of which send the same
message: "if this initiative passes, big changes will occur" (see Bowler and Donovan 1998 and
Lupia 1994 for more on initiative campaigns). Indeed, both proponents and opponents in an
initiative have incentives to claim that a proposed initiative will have a significant effect if it
wins. For both sides, such claims help to mobilize potential supporters.
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Initiative proponents and opponents also spend large sums of money to make their claims
heard. The average cost of an initiative campaign in California in 1998, for example, was
$8,401,934. The most expensive cost $66,922,504 and even the least expensive campaign cost
over $400,000. So unlike most political debates that occur in legislative chambers, debates over
initiatives take place in the public eye – in the newspapers, on television, literally in the public’s
living rooms and mailboxes. Citizens are therefore likely to be much more aware of initiatives
than of the typical piece of legislation brought to the floor of a statehouse. As a result, citizens are
more likely to be exposed to the claim that initiatives bring big change.
2. Initiative proponents are likely to have well-placed enemies
Since 1911, only 34% of the initiatives that qualified for the California ballot have
passed. Of those that passed, the courts overturned many. We contend that other governmental
actors have reinterpreted or neglected many more. Given this low rate of success and the high
costs of initiative campaigns, why would anyone choose to pursue policymaking by initiative? To
answer this question, we highlight three common motives of initiative sponsors.
For some groups, the initiative process provides benefits that legislative processes do not.
Most importantly, many places that use the initiative process make it difficult for the relevant
legislature to amend winning initiatives (Gerber 1999). Proponents of a policy who want to
protect it from this form of change have an incentive to use the initiative process.
For other groups, the initiative process is the only way to convert their policy ideals into
law. Supporters of term limits and certain types of campaign finance reform, for example, want
policies that many legislators are unwilling to impose on themselves. Other groups advocate
policies that the major parties dislike (e.g., open primaries), that cut across existing political
cleavages (e.g., bilingual education), that offend important legislative constituencies (e.g., tort
reform), or that legislators consider “too hot to handle” (e.g., immigration policy and gay

5

Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins

marriage). Indeed, these are the very types of groups the initiative process was initially intended
to empower (Deverell and Sitton 1994).
Still other groups use the initiative process to achieve goals for which victory at the polls
is not required. Some groups place measures on the ballot to get a particular policy agenda into
public view. While such groups are not doubt happier if their initiatives succeed, the publicity
that initiatives can attract is itself a desired end – particularly if the publicity induces subsequent
legislative action (Gerber 1996).
All initiative proponents, therefore, seek policy changes that constrain governmental
actors in some way. As a result, their winning initiatives may face special problems after Election
Day. For if the same governmental actors that opposed their ideas before the election are later
charged with implementing and enforcing them, a conflict may arise -- the actors have to choose
between pursuing their own policy interests or complying with the policy instructions of a
winning initiative.

The Model
We draw our findings from a model of an initiative’s post-election fate. To simplify the
exposition, we first describe a simple version of this model. In it, two agents who we call the
legislature and the bureaucracy determine the extent to which government implements a winning
initiative. For most initiatives, however, many more than two agents (e.g., multiple bureaucrats)
are involved in the implementation and enforcement of the measure. The second “advanced”
version of the model captures the dynamics of such situations by allowing any number of agents.
At the end of this section, we state our conclusions in the form of three results, two from the
simple model and one from the advanced model.
Actors
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We distinguish two types of governmental actors: implementation agents and
enforcement agents. Implementation agents are those in government responsible for providing
official instructions about how to comply with an initiative.2 Enforcement agents are those in
government responsible for following those directions. In most cases, different people are
assigned implementation and enforcement duties. A state legislature, for example, can have sole
authority to write implementation instructions or pass implementing legislation regarding a
winning initiative – particularly when the initiative has budgetary implications. In other cases, the
task of writing implementing legislation goes to high-ranking officials in bureaucratic agencies.
The state and local bureaucrats are often the actors charged with enforcing implementation
instructions or implementing legislation. There are also cases in which the line between
implementation and enforcement is not so sharply drawn – the same people must decide how to
implement an initiative and ensure that it gets enforced.
To simplify the description that follows, we refer to the implementing agent as the
legislature and the enforcing agent as the bureaucracy in our discussion of the simple model. We
use the terms "legislature" and "bureaucracy" as shorthand, reflecting the fact that these actors are
often asked to play the stated roles. Our findings about these two actors, however, clarify the
post-election incentives and opportunities faced by a wide range of governmental actors.
Preferences
What governmental actors share in common is that most, if not all, of them are motivated,
at least in part, by a desire to affect policy. This is not to say that any or all of these actors share
common beliefs about what policy outcomes are best or are most appropriate. In our model, we
posit that each actor has an ideal policy outcome and wants the initiative's impact to resemble its

2

Courts can be categorized as implementation agents in this context as rulings on a winning initiatives’
constitutionality serve as instructions to other governmental actors on what kinds of enforcement are
allowable. Since the courts’ role in such matters is typically to limit the reach of new laws, rather than to
augment their reach, our way of modeling implementation agents’ is analogous to the court’s decision
problem. However, since the courts’ ability to play this role is widely appreciated, we continue to focus on
the actions of non-court actors in order to pose a more direct challenge to the common wisdom.
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policy ideal as much as possible. If, for example, the bureaucracy is stocked with liberals and the
legislature is conservative, then we assume that the bureaucracy prefers forms of initiative
compliance that lead to more liberal policy outcomes, while the legislature prefers forms of
compliance that lead to more conservative outcomes. This portrayal of preferences is standard in
formal models and is beneficial in that it does not require us to depend on speculative claims
about the origins of actor preferences. So our model’s logic applies whether the legislature’s
preferences result from individual ideologies, party platforms, constituency pressures, or reelection considerations and whether the bureaucracy’s preferences derive from career ambitions
or personal ideologies. All that we require is that both actors are concerned with more than just
empty posturing; each must have some concern with the policy consequences of their actions.
Actions
We represent the government's reaction to a winning initiative as a process that entails
three stages: an implementation stage, an enforcement stage, and a sanctioning stage. Actions
taken in these stages determine the extent to which the policy that prevails on Election Day is the
policy that prevails after governmental actors react. Figure 1 shows the sequence of events.
Figure 1 Here
The game begins after an initiative’s victory on Election Day.3 The winning initiative
calls for policy p to replace the existing status quo policy, sq. For simplicity in describing our
model and results, we assume that p>sq (parallel results hold when sq>p). In other words, p
represents what initiative proponents want more of. Proponents of initiatives that entail new
spending want more money for their preferred policies – higher p represents more money.
Proponents of initiatives such as California’s Proposition 13, by contrast, want more fiscal
constraint – higher p represents a policy that entails decreased property taxes.
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The model’s most important premise is that passing an initiative does not guarantee its
implementation and enforcement. As is the case with any law, initiatives affect policy outcomes
only if government agents work them into the existing policy framework and commit the
resources that enforcement entails. So the question becomes, do governmental actors implement
and enforce policy p or do they act in ways that lead to policy outcomes other than p?
Implementation Stage
After an initiative wins, governmental actors must provide implementation instructions.
These instructions often take the form of implementing legislation by the legislature. In our
model, we represent such actions as instructions to enforcement agents to comply with the
initiative fully, partially, or not at all. We denote this instruction L∈ [sq, p] where L=p denotes
full compliance, L=sq denotes no compliance, and all other values of L (L∈(sq, p)) denote
varying levels of partial compliance.
We assume that the legislature faces implementation cost kl, which represents the
technical and political costs of implementation. Technical costs arise from having legislative staff
determine how to implement aspects of the initiative, plus the costs of actually establishing,
administering, and monitoring mandated programs. Political costs derive from taking resources
away from other programs in order to comply with the initiative. For example, legislative actors
may have to promise benefits on other issues to secure majority support for implementing
legislation.
We assume that the legislature must pay implementation costs if their legislation entails
policy change (i.e., L≠sq). By contrast, we assume that if the legislature chooses to do nothing
about implementation (i.e., L=sq), then it pays no implementation costs. To clarify a basic effect

3

Romer and Rosenthal 1978, a model of referendums, provides a parsimonious account of the strategic
considerations that initiative proponents take into account when they choose an initiative’s content. There
is, of course, the prior question of what interests can mobilize voter support (see, e.g., Gerber 1999). For
the purpose at hand, we simply recognize that such interests exist and focus on the extent to which
governmental actors comply with the initiatives they pass.
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of implementation costs, without getting into an abstract discussion of the topic and without a loss
of substantive generality, we assume that the legislature’s implementation costs are either
prohibitive (denoted kl=k+) or not prohibitive (kl=0). Compliance is possible only if costs are not
prohibitive. Court rulings, for example, that judge initiatives to be unconstitutional, or are
otherwise effective in restricting legislatures from taking certain actions regarding initiatives,
raise implementation costs to prohibitive levels.
If the legislature refuses to comply (i.e., L=sq), then there is no legislation for the
bureaucracy to enforce, the initiative dies, and the status quo policy prevails. If the legislature
passes implementing legislation (i.e., L≠sq) then the legislation is forwarded to the bureaucracy
and the process continues.
Enforcement Stage
The bureaucracy can comply with implementing legislation fully, partially, or not at all.
We denote this choice G∈ [sq, L], where G=L denotes following the legislature’s instructions
completely, G=sq denotes no compliance, and other values of G denote varying levels of partial
compliance. Since our goal is not to scrutinize court decision-making, the bureaucracy’s decision,
G, represents the initiative’s ultimate policy consequence. Like the legislature, we assume that the
bureaucracy faces enforcement costs for policy change (G≠sq). We denote these costs as kg and
define them analogously to kl.
Bureaucrats typically lack the authority to write implementing legislation (i.e.,
legislatures have the sole power to draft legislation and only they can authorize most forms of
spending; alternatively, it is easier for bureaucrats to do less than is asked of them than it is for
them to do more than what is asked). So if the legislature fails to draft implementing legislation,
then bureaucrats lack authority to act. They may, however, have some discretion in how to react
to implementing legislation.
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Sanctioning Stage
The process ends with a day of reckoning. We include this day of reckoning to represent
the following fact: supporters of an initiative may not stand idly by as governmental actors
dismantle the fruits of their electoral victory. Initiative supporters, who need not be the same
people who proposed the initiative or waged the campaign for it, may have the ability to mobilize
voters against non-compliant actors. Therefore, we assume that governmental actors can face
sanctions for non-compliance.
To keep our focus on how the decisions of governmental actors, we incorporate the threat
of sanctions in a simple way. We assume that sanctions are triggered only if compliance is not
full (G≠p) and the informational environment is such that supporters can observe this outcome. If
these conditions are met, then the legislature receives a sanction of size sl and the bureaucracy
receives a sanction of size sg. Otherwise, no sanctions are applied.
The sanction imposed upon the legislature need not equal the size of the sanction
imposed upon the bureaucracy. Allowing the legislature’s sanction to differ from the
bureaucracy’s sanction has several advantages. First, it allows us to include in our study cases
where proponents can impose different sanctions on the legislature and the bureaucracy – as
occurs when legislators are vulnerable electorally but the relevant bureaucrats are not. Second, it
allows us to include sanctions that appear equal by some measures but have different impacts on
the legislature and the bureaucracy.
In thinking about the role of sanctions, we recognize that many initiative supporters lack
the ability to track compliance and that it is plausible for perceived variations in such abilities to
affect governmental actors’ choices.4 Therefore, we say that the likelihood of sanction in our
4

Two factors make observing compliance particularly difficult. First, some initiatives specify a policy goal
without explicitly describing the means for achieving the goal or specify the steps a government must take,
but are vague about what end results the initiative supporters desire. This factor implies that compliance
may be difficult to measure, even if supporters are knowledgeable about government actions. Second, some
initiative supporters lack information about government actions. So even if means and ends are stated
clearly, the supporters may be unable to assess compliance.
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model depends on the extent to which supporters can observe the initiative’s policy impact, G.
Specifically, we assume that supporters observe G with probability z and observe nothing with
probability 1-z. For example, if z=.6, then there is a sixty percent chance that the supporters will
observe whether or not government complied with the initiative and a forty percent chance that
they will not. High values of z represent cases where supporters have good information and the
resources needed to carry out sanctions, while low values represent less able supporters. So if the
probability of observing compliance is sufficiently low, then governmental actors may have an
opportunity to "overturn the election result" with little fear of reprisal -- even if better-informed
supporters would impose large sanctions. We assume that governmental actors know the
likelihood of sanction when it is their turn to act, but that they learn the true extent of such
sanctions only after making their decisions (in the sanctioning stage.)5
Findings and Implications
We now present our findings. An appendix contains a formal description of the model,
technical statements of each result, and proofs. The results, summarized in Table 1, describe our
simple model's conditions for full compliance and no compliance, respectively.
Table 1: Summary of Results from the Simple model

Compliance Costs

Sanctions

Preferences

Result 1. No Compliance
Prohibitive

Any level

Any specification.

Not prohibitive

Low on all

The actor least favorable to p most prefers no
compliance.

Not prohibitive

High on some

One actor most prefers no compliance. The other

5

Indeed, in many initiative campaigns, it is often difficult for anyone – including governmental actors – to
anticipate how solvent or cohesive an initiative’s supporters will be after an election. Though some
initiatives are backed by stable interests, others are supported by organizations that cease to be active after
the election, and still others gain new supporters years after passage. Thus, it is important to include in the
model the possibility that when governmental actors make compliance decisions, they too may be uncertain
about the consequences of their actions.
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prefers no compliance to full compliance.
Result 1a. Partial Compliance
Not prohibitive

Low on all

The actor least favorable to p most prefers partial
compliance.

Not prohibitive

High on some

Both actors want partial compliance and at least
one actor does not face big sanctions.

Result 2. Full Compliance
Not prohibitive

Any level

Both want full compliance.

Not prohibitive

High on all

Any specification.

Not prohibitive

High on some

The actor that does not face big sanctions most
prefers full compliance.

Result 1: There is no compliance if compliance costs are prohibitive OR compliance
costs are not prohibitive and one of the following is true:
•

The legislature or bureaucracy not only prefers the status quo to any degree of
compliance but also faces small sanctions for non-compliance.

•

The legislature or bureaucracy prefers the status quo to any degree of compliance,
while the other actor prefers the status quo to full compliance and faces small
sanctions.
Result 1 specifies three sufficient conditions for no compliance with a winning initiative.

From the perspective of its policy impact, such outcomes are equivalent to governmental actors
overturning the election result.
The first condition for no compliance is straightforward – prohibitive costs prevent
compliance by definition. The second sufficient condition for no compliance arises when either
the legislature or the bureaucracy chooses not to comply because expected sanctions are small.
This ability to block compliance unilaterally comes about when an actor who faces small
sanctions prefers no compliance to any degree of partial compliance.
To see the dynamics that produce this result, suppose that the legislature prefers no
compliance to any degree of partial compliance. If its expected sanction for non-compliance is
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sufficiently small, then it has no incentive to write implementing legislation. Other governmental
actors’ preferences are irrelevant because no one else can write implementing legislation.
Therefore, the result is no compliance. The case where the bureaucracy prefers no compliance
and faces small sanctions has similar dynamics – regardless of the legislature’s preferences, the
bureaucracy ignores any implementing legislation it receives and the result is no compliance.
The third sufficient condition for no compliance arises when an actor who prefers no
compliance can reduce the choices available to another actor in a way that forces the latter to
choose no compliance as well. Suppose, for example, that the legislature prefers no compliance to
any other level of compliance. Unlike the previous example, however, suppose the legislature
faces large sanctions if compliance is less than full. Suppose further that the bureaucracy does not
face large sanctions and prefers partial compliance to other compliance levels. The bureaucracy,
if left to its own devices, will enforce its own desired partial compliance level – a level that the
legislature dislikes. Since the legislature can anticipate the bureaucracy’s response, it denies the
bureaucracy the discretion to interpret the initiative as it likes by refusing to proffer implementing
legislation – and no compliance occurs.
The conditions for partial compliance (labeled Result 1a above) are similar to those just
discussed for Result 1 and can be summarized as follows. As the initiative becomes more similar
to the preference of the actor who least prefers full compliance or as sanctions increase on that
actor, partial compliance replaces no compliance as the initiative’s post-electoral fate.
As we turn to the conditions for full compliance, we see that the same dynamic continues
and that full compliance -- while not impossible – requires specific circumstances.
Result 2: There is full compliance if and only if implementation and enforcement costs
are not prohibitive and one of the following is true:
•

The legislature and bureaucracy each either favor full compliance to any lower level
of compliance or face large sanctions.

•

The legislature prefers full compliance to the bureaucracy’s most preferred level and
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the bureaucracy faces large sanctions.

Governmental actors comply fully when either of Result 2’s sufficient conditions is met.
The first condition describes the simplest means by which full compliance occurs -- a government
filled with actors who most prefer full compliance. Otherwise, full compliance requires that the
initiative's opponents in government face large expected sanctions.
To see such conditions in action, consider California’s Proposition 140 of 1990. This
initiative imposed the following limits on the number of terms an individual could hold statewide
political offices: Members of the State Assembly can serve a maximum of three two-year terms;
State Senators and statewide officers (including Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney
General, Controller, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and
members of the Board of Equalization) can serve a maximum of two four-year terms. All of these
limits are lifetime bans, meaning that a person who has served the maximum number of terms in
an office must leave office and may never hold that office again.
While government actors have opportunities to exercise substantial discretion in
implementing many initiatives, the model explains why such opportunities were not available in
this case. Policy makers in the legislative and executive branches were virtually unanimous in
their opposition to the initiative. However, the expected sanctions for failing to implement and
enforce the term limits component of Proposition 140 were extremely high. The probability that
voters and interest groups would observe non-compliance was great, since the criteria were
specific, clear, and easy to observe (either elected officials left office when they were supposed to
or they did not). Moreover, the initiative's proponents were powerful. They spent over $2.5
million to support Proposition 140 during the campaign and were part of a national term limits
movement that was unlikely to back down from a challenge. More importantly, the courts raised
the specter of sanctions substantially by upholding the measure in repeated court challenges.
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Thus, although most legislators were strongly opposed to term limits, the threat of severe
sanctions forced them to comply.
The second sufficient condition describes a more complex route to full compliance. In it,
the bureaucracy and the legislature most prefer outcomes other than full compliance. Beyond this,
their disagreement is substantial. The legislature prefers greater compliance than the bureaucracy
and only the bureaucracy faces large sanctions. If the legislature can get the bureaucracy to
enforce the high degree of partial compliance that it most desires, it will write legislation that
gives the bureaucracy the ability to comply partially. The legislature knows, however, that the
bureaucracy will use such legislation to comply at a level that the legislature likes less than full
compliance. In other words, if the legislature gives the bureaucracy discretion to interpret the
initiative, the bureaucracy will use that discretion in ways that the legislature dislikes. Therefore,
the legislature instructs the bureaucracy to comply fully, placing the bureaucracy in the spotlight
and effectively reducing its choices to full compliance or sanctions. Since sanctions are large, it
chooses full compliance.
In sum, we expect full compliance if there exists a legislature that agrees with the
initiative and a bureaucracy who either wants full compliance or faces large expected sanctions. If
we substitute an unsympathetic legislature facing large sanctions for a legislature that desires full
compliance, then our expectation does not change. Otherwise, compliance is less than full.

ADVANCED MODEL
For many winning initiatives, compliance requires the cooperation of numerous actors.
Initiatives that change a state's education system, for example, require teachers, principals, and
members of school boards to join the legislature and other bureaucrats in complying with the new
law. If teachers, or school boards have the willingness to reinterpret winning initiatives and the
ability to do so without sanction, then we should expect compliance to be less than full.
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Consider, for example, the case of California’s Proposition 227. This proposition ordered
schools to replace the state’s previous system of bilingual education with a program of “English
immersion” – a policy change that requires teachers to use English textbooks and spoken English
for instruction. This initiative drew national attention and won by a large margin.
While Prop 227’s Election Day success seemed to imply a strong mandate for change,
empirical research by Gerber et al (2001) reveals only partial compliance. They find that in
districts where parents, teachers, and school officials preferred the English immersion program to
traditional bilingual education, compliance with the initiative has been substantial. By contrast, in
districts where such actors opposed Prop 227, the initiative proponents’ intent has been defied –
with no credible threat of sanctions on the horizon. This kind of outcome may not be unique, as
many initiatives require broad participation by bureaucrats.
To generalize our explanation of a winning initiative’s post-electoral fate, we now
describe a version of the model that involves N governmental actors, where N is any number
greater than two. As before, we assume that every relevant legislator and bureaucrat has an ideal
policy, faces costs and probabilistic sanctions, and can comply fully, partially, or not at all with
the instructions handed down by initiative proponents or other governmental actors.
With so many actors now in the model, and given all of the possible arrangements of
ideal policies, costs, and sanctions, the model’s dynamics become quite complicated. Therefore,
we focus on drawing a general conclusion about the likelihood of full compliance. To do so, we
define a situation that represents "normal conditions" for winning initiatives.
Under normal conditions:
• Each agent i favors full compliance (i.e., has ideal policy ai ≥ p) with probability <1.
• Each agent i faces large sanction si (i.e., such that p-ai ≤ zsi,) with probability <1.
• For each agent, the determination of these two probabilities is independent.
In other words, we assume that every additional agent need not prefer full compliance to
every other outcome nor must they be subject to huge sanctions for non-compliance. Indeed, the
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probability that an additional governmental actor supports full compliance for any particular realworld circumstance is difficult to guess in advance. It is also difficult to anticipate the extent to
which initiative supporters will have information and material resources sufficient to identify and
sanction non-compliant governmental actors, particularly if the actors are part of large
bureaucracies. Therefore, it is beneficial to make the least restrictive assumption about the
situation in question – the less restrictive assumptions we make, the broader the model’s
applicability. So we simply assume that under normal conditions, the probability that any
randomly selected governmental actor either favors full compliance or faces a large sanction is
below 100% -- it can be any other amount such as 0%, 30% or 99.99%. Put another way, we
assume that under normal conditions there is a chance, however small, that each additional
governmental actor will most prefer some outcome other than full compliance and that those who
want to levy large sanctions cannot do so. This assumption is almost certainly true for most real
world initiatives.
Such "normal conditions" produce the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Under normal conditions, as the number of people required to implement and
enforce an initiative grows, the likelihood of full compliance goes to zero.
This lemma states that regardless of whether each additional governmental actor is very
likely to favor full compliance or very unlikely, adding enough of these actors to the process
ensures that, under normal conditions, full compliance does not occur. Put another way, we do not
have to know much about the governmental actors in question to know that full compliance with
an initiative is very unlikely.
To generate our final result, we make two additional assumptions about "normal
conditions." These assumptions are motivated by the fact that initiatives vary in the precision of
instruction they provide to the governmental actors that must implement and enforce them. In
some cases, the instructions are so precise that there is little room for interpretation. For example,
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in the term limits component of California’s Proposition 140 compliance is easy to observe (e.g.,
if a member of the state assembly seeks a fourth term, people will know) and meaningful
sanctions are easy to apply (e.g., the Secretary of State can such people off the ballot.; also see
Gerber et al., 2001: 57-60). In other cases, including the campaign finance provisions of the same
California initiative and, indeed, under normal conditions, initiative proponents write documents
that have a considerable need for implementing legislation (i.e., they do not specify the
reassignment of existing human resources or the budgetary revisions that compliance requires).
We contend that the sources of variation in the precision of initiative legislation are
fundamental, but underappreciated, aspects of the initiative process. It is important to recognize
that the less precise an initiative’s policy instructions, the greater the room for interpretation by
governmental actors. Therefore, we assume that an increase in vagueness implies a decrease in z
(a decrease in the probability that initiative supporters discover and can act on a finding of noncompliance) or an increase in the number of compliance agents required for full compliance. This
first additional assumption generates a second lemma.

Lemma 2: Under normal conditions, as vagueness increases, the likelihood of full
compliance goes to zero.
The importance of this lemma is most clearly seen if we recall the reality of modern
initiative campaigns. Given the time restrictions of a thirty-second ad and the political damage
that can come from throwing too many details into an initiative, some initiative proponents place
a premium on simplicity. The result can be a sacrifice of precision in the instructions offered to
governmental actors. With such a sacrifice comes the need for greater interpretation, and with this
need comes a broader window of opportunity for actors who want to implement and enforce some
6

form of policy other than what a majority of voters chose at the polls.

6

One reason for vague language is practical: some initiative proponents simply do not know enough about
the law to write detailed implementation instructions. Others choose vague language for strategic purposes.
Indeed, a second reason for vague language is that initiative proponents must be able to convince a majority

19

Gerber, Lupia, and McCubbins

Our second additional assumption about normal conditions is that initiatives (like any
legislation or public policy) are characterized by at least some vagueness. This relatively
innocuous assumption, along with the logic of our lemmas, produces our final result.
Result 3: Under normal conditions, the preferences of governmental actors replace
initiative content as the ultimate determinant of an initiative's policy impact.
In other words, if an initiative’s instructions to governmental actors are somewhat vague
and either all actors involved in implementation and enforcement do not face large sanctions or
some do not support full compliance – that is, under normal conditions – then the stated
preferences of initiative proponents, as they exist in an initiative’s content, will be at least
partially displaced by the preferences of governmental actors. By this claim, we do not mean to
say that the preferences of initiative proponents are irrelevant to an initiative’s ultimate policy
impact. However, we do mean to say that without a heavy dose of initiative supporters or

of the electorate to support their initiative. If proponents want a type of policy that already has broad public
support, then they can proceed without having to trade outcomes they want for outcomes that can win.
Proponents of term limits clearly faced these highly favorable circumstances in many states. If, however, a
group supports an idea that is less popular, then the decisions they make in writing an initiative’s details are
critical. Potential proponents may have to diverge from their own policy ideals in order to make the
legislation acceptable to a majority of voters. This need to compromise drives some potential proponents
away from the initiative process: not getting exactly what they want makes them less able to justify the
considerable costs of waging an initiative campaign.
While writing vague initiatives can make initiatives more difficult for opponents to attack, they also allow
governmental actors greater discretion to reinterpret initiatives once they pass. If a proponent’s preferences
are similar to those of governmental actors charged with compliance, then vague language may be a small
price to pay for electoral victory. But if key governmental actors oppose the initiative, as will often be the
case for groups supporting issues that legislators refused to address in the past or issues that will constrain
governmental actors in the future, then being vague for the purpose of winning the election can backfire at
implementation time. This point prompts questions about how initiative proponents would adapt to the
possibility that a strategy of being vague will backfire after the election. The answers depend largely on
proponent objectives, which vary. For some proponents, victory at the polls and full compliance are
necessary conditions for goal satisfaction. In this case, proponents should choose a level of precision that
maximizes the joint probability of victory and enforcement. We contend that the equilibrium to this part of
the game would resemble the communicative equilibrium of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Specifically, as
the policy ideal of the proponent converges to that of the decisive voter or government actor, the content of
the initiative will become more precise. However, we know that some proponents are as interested in the
indirect effects of their actions (e.g., publicizing a particular agenda or inducing subsequent legislative
action) as they are in victory or post-election success. We also know that not all initiative proponents are
savvy political veterans. In either case, the goal may be as minimal as achieving a certain amount of
attention for a specific cause or expressing a view of how policy should be – without clear expectations of
how others will react. In both cases, the proponent’s choice of precision is perhaps best treated as part of a
meta-game in which the entire initiative process is just a part.
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sanctions amongst the ranks of those charged with implementing and enforcing an initiative,
someone, somewhere will reinterpret or reject the voters’ mandate. When we recall that the
people most likely to resort to the initiative process are those who cannot get what they want
through normal legislative channels, then we realize just how much the deck is stacked against
full compliance. Such people are likely to have powerful opponents lying in wait. Indeed, under
normal conditions, governmental actors will alter election results.

Conclusion
Until now, most of the attention paid to the initiative process focused on the period up to
and including Election Day. Recent scholarship on this part of the process reveals that much of
what we thought we knew about campaign dynamics, voter decision-making, and interest group
influence was false (see, e.g., Magleby 1984, Bowler and Donovan 1998). What happens in this
pre-election part of the initiative process is clearly important to our understanding its policy
consequences. But the end of this period is not the end of the story.
Winning initiatives, like other legislation, are incapable of enforcing and implementing
themselves. Someone, somewhere in government must take certain actions if a winning initiative
is to have the impact that its proponents envisioned. Therefore, we contend that the period
following Election Day is as important to understanding the effects of the initiative process as the
period preceding the election. Indeed, like scholarship on the pre-election period, we find that
widely-held assumptions about the initiative process’s post election period – including that it can
be ignored without cost in discussions of the impact of direct democracy – is false.
Our model clarifies some of the differences in what happens to initiatives after they pass.
In combination with empirical work on initiative implementation (Gerber et al 2001), it explains
why some are implemented fully, some are implemented partially, and others are not
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implemented at all. We contend that such findings can be useful when attempting to understand
the politics of the growing number of states and localities that allow initiatives.
Consider, for example, common critiques of the initiative process. In years of legislative
stalemate, critics blame voter initiatives for tying legislators’ hands and delaying legislative
negotiations. In years of budgetary problems, critics blame initiatives for their legislature's
inability to fund certain programs. Unlike many political critiques, this one is non-partisan.
Critics from the left, right, and center join political insiders and political outsiders in blaming the
initiative process for outcomes they dislike. The initiative process is an easy scapegoat for critics
of state politics. Our work suggests that the choices of elected officials, rather than the actions of
voters, are more likely the cause of the impasses in question.
Our work also reveals how the actions of future initiative proponents will affect their
ability to impact public policy. It shows the importance of considering whether sanctions for noncompliance exist in places where their opponents in government are likely to be. As a result, we
clarify the link between the actions taken by initiative proponents and their ability to change what
government does. Such clarity is not only of scholarly interest, but can help the growing number
of people whose lives are touched by some aspect of the initiative process direct their political
energies with a greater understanding of the consequences.
While many others have espoused views on the policy consequences of the initiative
process, most draw their conclusions by focusing exclusively on the legal challenges that follow
so many winning initiatives. However, just because court decisions are more public than the kinds
of legislative and bureaucratic pocket vetoes described in the previous pages does not make them
more important. To understand what happens to initiatives after they pass, it is important to
consider the actions of legislators and bureaucrats.
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Appendix: Additional Technical Details and a Proof
PREMISES: SIMPLE MODEL
Let the sequence of events be as described in the text. Unless otherwise stated, all aspects of the
game are common knowledge. In addition to the notation introduced in the text, we use the following
notation.
•

The initiative is a mandate to replace the pre-existing policy status quo on a particular topic sq∈ℜ,
with a different policy, p∈ℜ. For expositional simplicity, we describe the case where p> sq. The case
p < sq has equivalent dynamics, and the case p=sq is trivial.

•

kl is the legislature's compliance costs. To clarify the effect of such costs in a simple manner, we
assume that kl∈{0, k+}, where k+ is greater than the highest benefit that the legislature can receive
from full compliance. We define kg analogously for the bureaucracy.

•

Z∈ {0, 1} denotes whether or not the supporter observes policy outcome G where Z=1 denotes the case
where it does. From the assumption about the supporter's information in the text, Z=1 with probability
z and Z=0 with probability 1-z. S∈ {0, 1} denotes whether or not state government is in full
compliance with the initiative. S=1 if it is not (i.e., G ≠ p). When S=Z=1, sanctions occur. Otherwise,
they do not.
We denote the legislature’s ideal policy as l∈ [0, 1], and the bureaucracy’s ideal policy as g∈ [0,

1]. Each player wants the game's final policy outcome to be as close as possible to their ideal while
minimizing their compliance costs and sanctions. The legislature's utility from outcome G∈(sq, p] is Ul = |G - l| - ZslS - kl and the bureaucracy's utility is Ug= - |G - g| - ZsgS - kg. From outcome G=sq, the respective
the legislature’s utility is - |sq - l| - ZslS and the bureaucracy's utility is Ug= - |sq - g| - ZsgS. Since, the value
of Z is not revealed until the game's final stage, players base their decisions on expected utility calculations,
where EUl(L|P, G, l, sq, z, sl, sg, kl, kg) denotes the legislature's expected utility, where EUg(G|P, L, g, sq, z,
sg, kg) denotes the bureaucracy's expected utility, and where z replaces Z in the players' expected utility
calculations.
We make a simplifying assumption about player actions in the event that two or more actions
generate equal expected utility: If two compliance levels provide a player with the same expected
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utility, then the player chooses the one with a lower cost. If the costs are equal, then the player chooses the
one that cannot induce a sanction. If the sanctions are equal, then the player chooses the one that is closest
to its ideal. This assumption is for accounting convenience and does not affect the substance of our results.
•

We use the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium concept (see Binmore 1992 for an explanation). A
subgame perfect equilibrium in our model is the strategy set L*∈[sq, p] and G*∈[sq, L] that
constitutes best responses to the strategies of other players, taking into account the sequence of actions.
CONCLUSIONS: SIMPLE MODEL

Proposition: The unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of our model is:
•

If kl=k+ or kg=k+ or [kg=kl=0 and either ""min(g, sq)≥l and p>l and p- sq > zsl" or "zsl ≥ p - sq and p
- max(g, sq) > zsg and "either p>sq≥g>l or p>g>sq≥l" "], then L=G=sq.

•

If kg=kl=0 and g<min(l, p) and g≤sq and p - sq > zsg, then L=p and G= sq.

•

If kg=kl=0 and g≤min(l, sq)<p and p-l > l-sq + zsl and p-l > zsl and zsg ≥ p - sq, then L=l and G=sq.

•

If kg=kl=0 and either min(g, l)≥p or "g≥p≥l and zsl ≥ p - max(l,sq)" or "l≥p>g and zsg ≥ p - max(g,
sq)" or "p>max(g,l) and zsl ≥ p - max(l,sq) and zsg ≥ p - max(g, sq)" or "g<l<p and zsl<p-l≤ lmax(g,sq) + zsl and zsg ≥ p - max(g, sq)," then L=G=p.

•

If kg=kl=0 and either "g≥l>sq and p>l and p-l > zsl" or "p>g>l>sq and zsl≥p-l and p-g>zsg," then
L=G=l.

•

If kg=kl=0 and sq<g<min(l, p) and p - g > zsg, then L=p and G=g.

•

If kg=kl=0 and sq<g<l<p and p-l > l-g + zsl and zsg ≥ p-g, then L=l and G=g.

Proof:
We prove the proposition by backward induction on the model’s extensive form. This procedure
entails first deriving the bureaucracy's best response in all of the situations in which it could be and then
deriving the legislature's best response given how it expects the bureaucracy to respond. Those familiar
with the concept of backward induction will find the proof very straightforward. For others, we augment
the math with intuition at key points.
At the time of its decision, the bureaucracy's expected utility is: EUg(G=sq) = -|sq - g|- zsg,
EUg(G∈(sq, p)) = - |G - g| -zsg - kg, and EUg(G=p) = - |p - g| - kg.
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•

If kg=k+, then G=sq. This follows from the assumption kg>|sq-g|+zsg.

•

If kg=0 and g≥L, then G=L. For ∀g ≥ L, L < p, EUg(G∈[sq, L]) = - g - G -zsg and ∂EUg(G∈[sq, L])/

∂G=1. For L=p, EUg(G=L) = - |p - g|. EUg is maximized as G approaches L. If zsg> 0, the bureaucracy
maximizes expected utility at G=L. If zsg=0, G=L by the tie-breaking rule. In words, the bureaucracy
selects L because it is as close to its ideal policy as the initiative and the legislature's prior actions
allow it to get. If L=p, this action is also the only one that precludes a sanction.
•

If kg=0, max(g, sq)<L, L=p, and zsg ≥ p - max(g, sq), then G=L. Suppose g>sq (the case g≤sq follows
equivalent logic). Then, EUg(G∈[sq, g]) = - g - G - zsg, ∂EUg(G∈[sq, g])/ ∂G=1, EUg(G∈[g, L)) = G - g - zsg, and ∂EUg(G∈[g, L])/ ∂G=-1. Therefore, the bureaucracy maximizes EUg within [sq, p) at
G=g. However, zsg ≥ p - g. Therefore, EUg(G=L) = - |p - g|≥ - zsg = EUg(G=g). Thus, the bureaucracy
maximizes EUg at G=L. In words, expected sanctions outweigh the policy benefits of partial or no
compliance.

•

If kg=0, max(g,sq) <L, L=p and p - max(g, sq) > zsg, then G=g. Suppose g>sq (the case g≤sq follows
equivalent logic). Here, EUg(G∈[sq, g]) = - g - G - zsg, ∂EUg(G∈[sq, g])/ ∂G=1, EUg(G∈[g, L)) = G - g - zsg and ∂EUg(G∈[g, L])/ ∂G=-1. Therefore, within [sq, p), the bureaucracy maximizes EUg at
G=g. Since p-g > zsg, EUg(G=L) = - |p - g|< - zsg = EUg(G=g). Thus, the bureaucracy maximizes EUg
at G=g. In words, the policy benefits of its preferred level of compliance outweigh the expected
sanctions for non-compliance.

•

If kg=0, L≠p and max(g, sq)<L, then G= max(g, sq). Suppose g>sq (the case g≤sq follows equivalent
logic). In this case, EUg(G∈[sq, g]) = - g - G - zsg, ∂EUg(G∈[sq, g])/ ∂G=1, EUg(G∈[g, L]) = - G - g
- zsg, and ∂EUg(G∈[g, L])/ ∂G=-1. Therefore, the bureaucracy maximizes EUg at G=g. In words,
because the legislature has already made the decision to comply only partially, the bureaucracy's
actions cannot trigger a sanction. Therefore, it enforces only its most preferred policy.
We now derive the legislature's equilibrium strategy. As was true of the bureaucracy, if kl=k+,

then L=sq. This follows from the assumption kl>|sq-l|+zsl. Also, if kg=k+, then G=sq and L=p. In this
case, EUl(L∈[sq, p]) = - |sq - l| - zsl. By the tie-breaking rule, L=p. Henceforth, we derive the legislature's
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best response for kl=kg=0. To make the proof easier to follow, we classify cases by the gubernatorial
responses that they induce. Note that the subcases are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
Case 1: g≥L induces G=L. Here, EUl(L∈[sq, p)) = - |L - l| - zsl and EUl(L=p) = - |p - l|.
•

If min(g, l)≥p, then L=p. In this case, EUl(L∈[sq, p)) = -l-L-zsl. Since ∂EUl(L∈[sq, p))/∂L=1, EUl is
maximized in this range as L approaches p. At L=p, EUl(L) = - |p - l|. Since zsl ≥ 0, EUl(L) ≥
max(EUl(L∈[sq, p))). In words, the legislature selects p because it is as close to its ideal policy as the
initiative allows.

•

If g≥p≥l and zsl ≥ p - max(l,sq), then L=p. Suppose l>sq (the case l≤sq follows equivalent logic).
Here, EUl(L∈[sq, l]) = -l-L -zsl and EUl(L∈[l, p)) = -L-l-zsl. ∂EUl(L∈[sq, l])/∂L=1. ∂EUl(L∈[l,
p))/∂L=-1. Therefore, within [sq, p), the legislature maximizes EUl at L=l. Since zsl ≥ p - l, EUl(L=p) =
-|p-l|≥ - zsl = EUl(L=l). Therefore, the legislature maximizes EUl at L=p. In words, the expected
sanctions outweigh the benefits of moving the policy outcome from the proponent's ideal policy to the
legislature's most preferred policy.

•

If g≥l and p>l and p-max(l, sq) > zsl, then L=max(l, sq). Suppose l>sq (the case l≤sq follows
equivalent logic). Here, EUl(L∈[sq, l]) = - l - L - zsl and EUl(L∈[l, p)) = - L - l - zsl. ∂EUl(L∈[sq,
l])/∂L=1. ∂EUl(L∈[l, p))/∂L=-1. Therefore, the legislature maximizes EUl within [sq, p) at L=l. Since
zsl < p - l, EUl(L=p) = - |p - l|< - zsl = EUl(L=l). Thus, the legislature maximizes EUl at L=p. In
words, the legislature faces insufficient sanctions for non-compliance and the bureaucracy prefers the
legislature's ideal level to any smaller level.

Case 2: g<L and p - max(g,sq) > zsg induce G=max(g, sq). Here, EUl(L∈[max(g,sq), p]) = - |max(g, sq) l| - zsl.
•

If g<min(l, p), then L=p. Suppose g>sq (the case g≤sq follows equivalent logic). Since g<L and
L∈[sq, p], g<p, EUl(L∈[g, p]) = - l - g - zsl and ∂EUl(L∈[g, p))/∂L=0. Therefore, the legislature gets
equal expected utility from any L∈[g, p]. By the tie-breaking rule, L=p as it is the only L∈[g, p] not
sufficient to cause a sanction. In words, the bureaucracy faces insufficient sanctions for noncompliance. It prefers partial compliance and less compliance than the legislature. The legislature
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implements p knowing that it cannot prevent the bureaucracy from enforcing only partial compliance.
Case 3: g<L and p - max(g,sq) > zsg induces G=max(g, sq) while g≥L induces G=L. Here, EUl(L∈[sq,
g]) = - |L - l| - zsl, EUl(L∈[max(g,sq), p]) = - |max(g, sq) - l| - zsl, and EUl(L=p) = - |p - l|.
•

If p>g>l and zsl ≥ p - max(l,sq), then L=max(l,sq). Suppose l>sq and g>sq (the other cases follow
equivalent logic). If g≥L, then, G=L. Therefore, EUl(L∈[sq, l]) = -l-L-zsl and EUl(L∈[l, g]) = -L-l-zsl.
Since ∂EUl(L∈[sq, l])/∂L=1 and ∂EUl(L∈[l, g])/∂L=-1, the utility is maximized in [sq, g], -zsl, at L=l.
If g<L and p - max(g,sq) > zsg, then G=max(g, sq). In this case, EUl(L∈[g, p]) = - g-l - zsl < -zsl
=EUl(L=l). Therefore, the legislature maximizes EUl at L=l. In words, the bureaucracy faces
insufficient sanctions and prefers the legislator's ideal policy to full compliance. Since the bureaucracy
will act alone regarding partial compliance if required, the final likelihood of sanction is independent
of the legislature's actions. Therefore, the legislature implements its most preferred policy and the
bureaucracy accepts it.

Case 4: g<L and zsg ≥ p - max(g, sq) and L=p induce G=L while g<L and zsg ≥ p - max(g, sq) and L≠p
induce G=max(g, sq). Here, EUl(L∈[sq, p)) = - |max(g, sq) - l| - zsl and EUl(L=p) = - |p - l|.
•

If l≥p>g, then L=p. Suppose g>sq (the case g≤sq follows equivalent logic). Since g<L and L∈[sq, p],
g<p, EUl(L∈[g, p)) = -l - g - zsl and ∂EUl(L∈[g, p))/∂L=0. Therefore, the legislature gets equal
expected utility from any L∈[g, p). At L=p in this case, G=L. Therefore, EUl(L=p) = - l-p. Since l≥p,
the legislature maximizes EUl at L=p. In words, the legislature favors full compliance and the
bureaucracy faces sufficient sanctions.

•

If p>max(g,l) and zsl ≥ p - max(l,sq), then L=p. Suppose l>sq (the case l≤sq follows equivalent logic).
In this case, EUl(L∈[sq, l]) = -l-L -zsl and EUl(L∈[l, p)) = -L-l-zsl. ∂EUl(L∈[sq, l])/∂L=1. ∂EUl(L∈[l,
p))/∂L=-1. Therefore, within [sq, p), the legislature maximizes EUl at L=l. Since zsl ≥ p - l, EUl(L=p) =
-|p-l|≥ - zsl = EUl(L=l). Therefore, the legislature maximizes EUl at L=p. In words, both the
bureaucracy and the legislature face expected sanctions sufficient to induce full compliance.

•

If kl=0, g<l<p and zsl<p-l≤ l-max(g,sq) + zsl, then L=p. Suppose g>sq (the case g≤sq follows
equivalent logic). Given the bureaucracy's reaction in this case, EUl(L∈[sq, g]) = -l-L -zsl and
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EUl(L∈[g, p)) = -l-g -zsl. ∂EUl(L∈[sq, g])/∂L=1. ∂EUl(L∈[g, p))/∂L=0. Therefore, within [sq, p), the
legislature maximizes EUl at L∈[g, p). Since p-l≤ l-max(g,sq) + zsl, EUl(L=p) = -|p-l|≥ -|l-max(g,sq)| zsl = EUl(L=l). Therefore, the legislature maximizes EUl at L=p. In words, if the legislature chooses a
partial compliance level at or above that of the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy will enforce only its own
preferred level. If the legislature chooses full compliance, the bureaucracy -- whose partial compliance
decision would then trigger sufficient sanctions -- will as well. The legislature prefers full compliance
to the bureaucracy's most preferred level. Therefore, it implements p, sacrificing its own ideal policy
for the sake of reducing the bureaucracy's discretion.
•

If g<l<p and p-l > l-max(g,sq) + zsl, then L=l. Suppose g>sq (the case g≤sq follows equivalent logic).
Given the bureaucracy's reaction in this case, EUl(L∈[sq, g]) = -l-L -zsl and EUl(L∈[g, p)) = -l-g -zsl.
∂EUl(L∈[sq, g])/∂L=1. ∂EUl(L∈[g, p))/∂L=0. Therefore, within [sq, p), the legislature maximizes EUl,
EUl= -|l-max(g,sq)| - zsl, at L∈[g, p). Since p-l> l-max(g,sq) + zsl, EUl(L=p) = -|p-l|< -|l-max(g,sq)| zsl = EUl(L=l). From this inequality and the tie-braking rule, we get L=l. In words, if the legislature
chooses a partial compliance level at or above that of the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy will enforce
only its own preferred level. If the legislature chooses full compliance, the bureaucracy -- whose
partial compliance decision would then trigger sufficient sanctions -- will as well. The legislature
prefers the bureaucracy's preferred level to full compliance. Therefore, it chooses partial compliance to
expand the bureaucracy's discretion.

QED.
Result 1. No compliance ⇔ kl=k+ or kg=k+ or [kg=kl=0 and either ""min(g, sq)≥l and p>l and p- sq >
zsl" or "zsl ≥ p - sq and p - max(g, sq) > zsg and "either p>sq≥g>l or p>g>sq≥l" " or "g<min(l, p) and g≤sq
and p - sq > zsg" or "g≤min(l, sq)<p and p-l > l-sq + zsl and p-l > zsl and zsg ≥ p - sq."]
Result 2. Full compliance ⇔ kg=kl=0 and either min(g, l)≥p or "g≥p≥l and zsl ≥ p - max(l,sq)" or "l≥p>g
and zsg ≥ p - max(g, sq)" or "p>max(g,l) and zsl ≥ p - max(l,sq) and zsg ≥ p - max(g, sq)" or "g<l<p and
zsl<p-l≤ l-max(g,sq) + zsl and zsg ≥ p - max(g, sq)," then L=G=p.
Remaining case. Partial compliance level l>sq ⇔ kg=kl=0 and either "g≥l>sq and p>l and p-l > zsl" or
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"p>g>l>sq and zsl ≥ p - l and p - g > zsg." Partial compliance level g>sq ⇔ kg=kl=0 and either
"sq<g<min(l, p) and p - g > zsg" or "sq<g<l<p and p-l > l-g + zsl and zsg ≥ p - g."
The proofs of Results 1-2 follow directly from the proof of the equilibrium.

ADDITIONAL PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS: ADVANCED MODEL
Additional Premises
•

Let the game involve additional agents. Let each agent be an independent draw from a large set of
potential agents, I. Let |I|>0 denote the number of additional agents drawn.

•

Let each agent have skills identical to those of the bureaucracy. That is, let every agent i∈I make a
choice Ci∈[sq, Ci-1], where Ci-1 refers to the choice of the previous agent and C0=p. Let them also face
costs ki, where such costs are defined analogously to those of the legislature and the bureaucracy.

•

Let the distribution I have the following qualities under "normal conditions"
•

Each additional agent i has ideal policy ai ≥p, with probability <1.

•

Each additional agent i faces sanction si such that p-ai ≤ zsi, with probability <1.

•

For each agent, let the determination of these two probabilities by independent.

•

Let an increase in vagueness imply a decrease in z or an increase in |I|.

•

Let Gx, be the game's final outcome in a game with |I|=x agents under normal conditions.

First Lemma. If normal conditions persist, then as |I| increases, the likelihood of full compliance goes to
zero.
Proof: If any agent's compliance costs are prohibitive or if the bureaucracy and legislature do not satisfy
the conditions of Result 2, then the likelihood of full compliance is zero. It remains to show that the
likelihood of full compliance approaches zero as |I| increases for the case where the conditions of Result 2
are satisfied for the legislature and the bureaucracy. Note that every additional agent faces a decision
calculus identical in structure to that of the bureaucracy. So for any added agent, ai <p and p-ai > zsi,
implies max(ai,sq) <Gi-1, and p - max(ai, sq) > zsg, implies Ci≠p. Under normal conditions, prob(ai <p ∧ p-
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ai > zsi >0 for any single added agent. Denote this probability q>0. When |I|=N>0, the probability that ai
<p ∧ p-ai > zsi for at least one agent is Q=N!q(1-q)N-1. Since q>0, as N grows, Q⇒1. Since only one such
agent is needed for less than full compliance, as N grows, the probability of full compliance goes to zero.
QED.
Second Lemma: If normal conditions persist, then as |I| increases, the likelihood of full compliance goes
to zero.
Result 3: If normal conditions persist and |I| is sufficiently high, then there exists an agent x∈I, for whom
final outcome Gx is closer to ax than it is to p.
The proofs of these Results follow logic equivalent to that of the proof of the first lemma.
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Figure 1. Extensive form for Simple model
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